Economic Incentives:
Perfect in the classroom; problematic in the real world

For a profession usually caricatured as the “dismal science,” economists are a remarkably optimistic bunch. For several decades now, the profession has striven to prove to non-economists that there are efficient ways to overcome (usually negative) externalities. The two most popular economic prescriptions are permits (i.e., transferable property rights) and charges (i.e., taxes). The optimal permit price or tax equals the difference between private and social cost (or benefit.

What succeeds elegantly in the economics literature and in the classroom does not in practice. The reason turns out to be simple. Governments refuse to abide by the prescriptions of economists.

  1. Economic incentive schemes are much harder to target efficiently in practice than they are in the classroom; targeting inefficiency creates dead-weight loss.
  2. When governments establish transferable permit schemes to overcome an externality, they refuse to make these permits fully transferable or otherwise confiscate their value.
  3. When governments establish charge or tax regimes to overcome an externality, they refuse to set the charge or tax equal to the difference between private and social cost (or benefit).
  4. Although economists intend for economic incentives to restore optimal prices to the market, governments use them to generate revenue.

This page provides a dynamic catalog of examples, sorted by date.

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The IRS Exempt Organizations Scandal
Part 4: Which information demands were illegal?

On Capitol Hill today, Acting Commissioner Steven Miller testified about the IRS scandal. Based on news reports (a transcript is not available), he was asked whether what the IRS Exempt Organizations division had done was illegal. He characterized it as a “foolish mistake,” but denied that it was illegal.

Whether it was in fact illegal depends on what statute is used as the reference. Lacking expertise in tax law, Neutral Source focuses on whether the IRS’ actions violated the Paperwork Reduction Act. For the sample case we have examined,  the IRS’ screening or targeting actions that were the subject of the question posed to Miller would not be affected by the Paperwork Act. For the Paperwork Act to be relevant, the IRS screening or targeting would have had to be undertaken in the context of a survey or research project.

Nonetheless, it does appear that several of the questions posed in the IRS’ follow-up demand letters were illegal under the PRA.

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The IRS Exempt Organizations Scandal
Part 3: The Inspector General’s report

On May 14, the Inspector General for Tax Administration released its audit of IRS review of applications for IRC 501(c)(4) tax exempt status. TIGTA’s conclusion does not address the Paperwork Reduction Act issues noted in Part 1 and Part 2 of this series. For that reason, some of its conclusions are premature.

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The IRS Exempt Organizations Scandal
Part 2: The unapproved information collection sent to one applicant

The latest story in the IRS exempt organizations scandal that has Paperwork Reduction Act implications is the release of the list of questions the IRS sent to one applicant allegedly targeted for unusually burdensome scrutiny. While some of these questions are legitimate, others clearly are not.

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The IRS Exempt Organizations Scandal
Are targets protected by the Paperwork Reduction Act?

On Friday, exempt organizations division chief Lois G. Lerner revealed to an American Bar Association conference that the Internal Revenue Service had targeted certain applicants for exempt status for heightened scrutiny based on their political views. This admission came after IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman testified before Congress in March 2012, “There’s absolutely no targeting” of conservative groups by the IRS. Over the weekend the story has become a major scandal; a Google search for Lerner’s name this morning yielded more than 150,000 hits.

Today we explore an unreported aspect of the case: Can those who were targeted by the IRS obtain any relief through the Paperwork Reduction Act?

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Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013:
Part 3: Who bears the cost of tax collection?

In today’s Wall Street Journal, retired accountant Raymond L. Dever proposes to “level the playing field” among retailers by shifting the burden of tax collection to the States. Dever’s argument in favor of his proposal also explains why Congress is unlikely to adopt it. And by “leveling the playing field” this way, it would unlevel it in others.

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Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013:
Part 2: Comparing alternative unlevel playing fields

Previously we have noted that the proposed Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013 purports to “level the playing field” between brick-and-mortar and Internet retailers, but that its design actually substitutes one unlevel playing field for another.  Now that the bill has passed the Senate and moved on to the House, a comparison of the options might be helpful for showing that every potentially level playing field is unlevel in other ways.

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