The Terrorist Risk from Snow Globes
14 Sep 2006 in Regulatory Science, Regulatory Economics, Regulatory Policy
Columnist Mark Steyn relates a sadly amusing anecdote among about airline security that illustrates how US policies and practices lack a coherent risk-analytic basis. Apparently, snow globes are too risky to permit onboard commercial aircraft.
Steyn's column is in the September 11 print edition of National Review, which is not availabe online.
I was at the airport in Auckland the other day and mooching around the duty-free shop. My little girl likes snow globes, so I picked out one showing some charming New Zealand sheep. No snow, technically, but when you shook it little stars sparkled around the ovine cuties. The Kiwi sales clerk swiped my credit card, wrapped it up, and then said, “Oh, wait. Are you flying to America?”
Steyn discovered that snow globes are prohibited items because they contain liquid, and liquids are not permitted onboard any aircraft destined for the US.
In theory, I could smash the incredibly thick glass, replace the sparkly stuff with something more incendiary, re-glaze it in the airport men’s room with help from co-conspirators among the shadowy networks of antipodean jihadist glaziers, and board the plane to explosive effect. When I scoffed at this thesis, the lady said somewhat petulantly, “Well, it’s not my fault you’re going to America.”
Which is hard to argue with. If I’d wanted to fly a souvenir snow globe to Yemen, Saudi Arabia, or Belgium, there’d have been no problem. I could breeze through the metal detector with a pair of snow globes in each hand shaking them like Carmen Miranda. The jihad may never achieve global domination over the Great Satan, but it has already achieved snow-global domination.
Steyn's characterization is as far-fetched as it is technically apt. The snow globe in question was marketed within the so-called "sterile area," and thus posed no risk. The Department of Homeland Security's ban on snow globes imposes costs and provides zero benefits.
